During the Glasgow harbour riot of January 1919 black British colonial sailors were branded as unfair economic competitors by the national seamen's unions and their local delegates, chased out of the merchant marine hiring yard by white sailors when they sought jobs, beaten in the street, attacked in their boarding house and then targeted for mass arrest by police called in to halt the disorder.
1980s and was appointed a minister in the Attlee government, while Willie
Gallacher became a leading member of the Communist Party of Great Britain and served as an MP for fifteen years. Given this wider context, it is not too much to claim that the events surrounding the Glasgow harbour riot reflect Britain's uneven metropolitan and colonial relationship, and illustrate a general feeling of political instability via government fears over Bolshevism associated with strike action in the period. Peacetime issues facing the organised labour movement are also highlighted through the concerted actions of trade unions taken in the belief that full employment was to be one of the first casualties of peace.
In spite of the serious and widespread extent of the port riots and their broad impact around the British Empire; for example, African Caribbean sailors repatriated to the West Indies launched revenge attacks on white sailors and businesses in the months following the riots; they have remained largely overlooked by 'mainstream' historians of the period. 4 The riots have, however, been discussed by a number of writers on black and immigration history. 5 One aspect of the riots commented upon by historians is the conflicting attitudes among white and colonial black British residents towards their relative positions in the British imperial hierarchy. Rowe stated that 'while whites viewed blacks as foreign, different and inferior, blacks viewed themselves as citizens and defenders of the British Empire.' 6 Holmes noted that 'the incidents in the ports were… a reflection within a metropolitan context of the racialism that had developed as a result of British imperial and colonial rule.' 7 While the outbreak of the 1919 seaport riots have therefore been measured against constructed 'meanings' of national identity, this article incorporates the expressed opinions of black working and middle class British residents on their status and imperial obligations. 8 The broader issue of what may be crudely described as 'race' and labour has been addressed in several studies. 9 Works by Lunn and Tabili have considered the often racist campaigns and actions of the leading sailors' organisation, the National Sailors' and Firemen's' Union and the relationship between colonial workers and trade unions' in the merchant shipping industry. 10 Lunn has indicated that such broad consideration of union activity should reflect, wherever possible, local as well as national views and policy. 11 
Events in
Glasgow in 1919 are used here as a means to present a local interpretation of the national sailors' union's hostile stance towards black sailors.
Personal accounts of the 40-hours strike and this period in the history of 'Red Clydeside' have overlooked the riot at Glasgow harbour. Although the events were linked, the memoirs of Gallacher and Shinwell and Harry McShane's account of the 40-hours strike fail to mention it. 12 Historical accounts too, have ignored the riot. This may be due to a combination of the fact that the harbour rioting is not featured in the personal recollections of 'Red Clydeside' and as a matter of convenience since the riot and organised trade union opposition to the employment of black sailors does not sit well against the politically-radical image of industrial relations on the Clyde.
II
The riot on Thursday 23 January 1919 began in the yard of the mercantile marine office in James Watt Street where sailors gathered for their chance to be signed on to a ship. While waiting to see if they would be hired, competing groups of black and white sailors jostled and shouted insults at each other. This baiting descended into a pitched battle which spilled out of the yard onto the street.
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More than thirty black sailors fled the sailors' yard pursued by a large crowd of white sailors. White locals joined the crowd which grew to several hundred strong. The rioters used guns, knives, batons and makeshift weapons including stones and bricks picked from the street. On being chased out of the hiring yard, the group of black sailors initially ran towards the nearby Glasgow sailors' home on the corner of James Watt Street and Broomielaw Street. 14 The white crowd smashed the windows of the sailors' home and then invaded it. The two or three beat police officers in the harbour area were overwhelmed and an additional force of 50 police officers was called in. The large police force cleared the two sets of rioters out of the sailors' home.
The black sailors fled along the broad street parallel to the River Clyde into their own boarding house at 118 Broomielaw Street. White rioters sought to force the sailors back out into the street by smashing the windows with missiles, surrounding the building and then attacking it. In response, some of the black colonial sailors fired shots down at the crowd. Police later found a revolver with three spent cartridges under a bed and five live cartridges lying in the hallway.
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Cornered in their boarding house the black sailors offered no resistance when the police force entered the premises. However, to restore order, the police removed 30 black sailors from the boarding house and into 'protective custody'.
All were subsequently charged with riot and weapons offences. None of the large crowd of white rioters was arrested.
Three people were seriously injured during the riot. Two were white sailors: Duncan Cowan who was shot and Thomas Carlin who had been stabbed.
Black West African sailor Tom Johnson was also stabbed. Cowan and Carlin were taken directly to hospital. Johnson, despite suffering from wounds to the back and leg, was arrested, brought before a magistrate and formally charged with shooting offences. Johnson's injuries, later described in his hospital record as 'gaping' wounds, were ignored or dismissed as irrelevant by the police and the white crowd. Johnson was removed from the riot scene in a police van, to the obvious pleasure of the white crowd who showered abuse on him as he was driven away for a court appearance. 15 Local press reports displayed little sympathy for Johnson, who was described in racist terms as: '... a darkie from Sierra Leone, who speaks little English, complained of having been stabbed, but his wound was not serious.' 16 In contrast to the immediate arrest of the wounded
Johnson and the mass detention of a group of black sailors, only one white person was later arrested for an alleged assault on a police officer during the riot.
The court cases which followed the rioting will be discussed later. forbade engineers from leaving the works where they were employed. CWC members including Willie Gallacher were jailed or deported from the Glasgow wartime production area for their 'unpatriotic' industrial protests.
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The general strike of January 1919 was in keeping with wartime industrial disputes on the Clyde. The strike began in Glasgow on Monday 27 January and within two days 70,000 workers had ceased production in engineering, shipbuilding, railway, electrical work and on the docks. Many thousands more workers around Scotland, in Belfast and on Tyneside also struck in support of a reduced working week.
As the campaign gathered momentum, the Glasgow strike committee telegraphed the government proposing a convention to discuss the trade unions'
proposals for a shorter working week. The government was in no mood to conciliate and regarded the mass public meeting planned by the strike committee as a provocative political gathering which threatened public order. The matter was discussed in cabinet on Thursday 30 January. With Prime Minister Lloyd
George at the Versailles peace talks, Bonar Law chaired the meeting: 'Mr Bonar Law said that he thought it vital for the war cabinet to be satisfied that there was sufficient force in Glasgow to prevent disorder… It was certain that, if the movement in Glasgow grew, it would spread all over the country.'
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The protest meeting at the municipal city chambers at George Square on Friday 31 January descended into a riot caused by police actions. 23 Police on horseback and on foot mounted a baton charge on the crowd, injuring 34 people, some of them bystanders unconnected to the demonstration. Nineteen police officers were also injured in the riot. Some members of the crowd fled, while others fought back, bringing the centre of Glasgow to a standstill as running battles spread out from George Square to surrounding streets. The Riot Act was read and the strike leaders arrested. Among them were Emanuel Shinwell who was later convicted of incitement to riot and given a five months' jail term, and
Willie Gallacher who was imprisoned for three months.
At a further cabinet meeting held hours after the 'Bloody Friday' riot, the Secretary for Scotland, Liberal MP Robert Munro, whose Scottish office and influence were based at Whitehall, alarmed his colleagues with his assessment of the situation: '… it was a misnomer to call the situation in Glasgow a strike -it was a Bolshevist rising.' 24 The cabinet ordered troops and tanks to be despatched to Glasgow that night. The following morning, 12,000 troops, 100
lorries and six tanks were moved into Glasgow city centre. Although the 40-hours strike in Glasgow was brought to an unsuccessful conclusion in mid February, the government made concessions over pay and hours during later disputes. Railway workers achieved an eight hour day and additional pay for night duty, overtime and Sunday working. The miners' were given a 20 per cent pay increase and were granted a seven hour working day. 29 During 1919, 2.4 million workers were involved in strike action; by comparison, 2.7 million went on strike in defeated Germany and 1.3 million in France in the same year. 30 Fears of 'direct action' leading to revolution induced the cabinet's industrial unrest committee to lay plans for a 'citizen guard' to deal with the potential dangers of a sustained general strike, in particular to run and protect public utilities. 31 The citizen guard was never formed and the military continued to have a role in industrial contingency arrangements. Troops were called in to quell port rioting in South Shields and south Wales, during the police strike in Liverpool and to protect railway stations in Glasgow and London during the autumn rail strikes.
III
The staging of a general strike in Glasgow, its collapse following 'Bloody Friday'
and the presence of tanks in the centre of the city were far more eye catching than the riot at the harbour a week earlier; however, the two episodes ought to be Gallacher sought to encourage unskilled workers including seamen to take part in the sort of strike action that had been the province of the skilled workforce on wartime Clydeside. Shinwell's later conviction for 'incitement to riot' was both for his presence as a strike leader at the George Square demonstration on 31
January and also for his speeches on prior days at James Watt Lane, outside the mercantile marine yard where the harbour riot broke out. In an interview published in a local evening newspaper the day after the harbour riot, Shinwell hinted that further violence was likely: 'Last night when I arrived at the Broomielaw, large crowds were hanging about, and I had considerable difficulty in restraining them from taking further action.' 33 He explicitly connected the harbour riot to the hiring of overseas sailors in Glasgow, by stating that 'some of the best ships' were employing black and Chinese labour, while a number of recently-demobilised (white British) Royal Naval
Reservists were unable to obtain employment.
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Over the next few days Shinwell continued to speak out at sailors' meetings against the threat to jobs due to the employment of 'Asiatic' labour on British ships, but he also broadened the nature of the protest meetings. The
Scottish press reported that the topic had been brought into the 40-hours strike received wage rates 20%-50% less than the standard rate. 41 The Royal Mail Line directly recruited African Caribbean seamen on similar unequal terms. Chinese sailors hired overseas were also paid less than the national rate. Such unequal pay rates contributed to attacks on Chinese-owned properties in Cardiff during the 1911 sailors' strike.
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Black colonial sailors hired in British ports (such as those who sought employment at Glasgow in January 1919) were better paid that those hired outside British waters, but they faced an increasingly competitive post-war job market. Black sailors from the British colonies had also to deal with the perception among white local port dwellers that they were part of a lower paid overseas workforce which, it appeared, was depriving (white) British workers of their livelihood. A press account of the Glasgow harbour riot stated: 'The trouble began because the blacks were being given preference over the whites in signing on for a ship about to sail. The whites resented this, especially as it is well known that coloured men are paid lower wages.' At the time of the port riots a variety of contemporary commentators drew attention to these intra-class divisions. Lawyer David Cook noted during the harbour riot trial, 'it was strange that so democratic a body as the Seafarers'
Union should object to the accused being members.' 51 Cook's irony was directed at the avowedly more radical of the two main sailors' union playing the 'race' card to attract and mobilise white members at the expense of their black co-workers.
During the wave of summer port rioting, similar critical comments were directed against the sailors' unions -albeit for political rather than legal purposes -in the socialist press. Two revolutionary Marxist newspapers attacked the liberal-dominated seamen's unions and the organised labour movement as a whole, for marginalising black fellow workers out of narrow self-interest.
The Workers' Dreadnought, the weekly newspaper of Sylvia Pankhurst's was 'peculiar' that although a black man had been wounded no white person had been arrested either for that offence or for playing any part in the rioting. property was adjacent to the black sailors' boarding house in the Broomielaw attacked by white rioters and from which shots were fired during the rioting. This claim for damages was recorded in the minutes of Glasgow corporation magistrates' committee. After hearing a report on the harbour disorder from chief constable, James Verdier Stevenson, the committee agreed to recommend that liability be repudiated, and authorised the town clerk be to defend any court action raised. 72 The outcome of the damages' claim was not recorded. It is unlikely to have succeeded since only in cases where a riot was proved to have taken place would the local authority accept liability for damaged property.
Following the mass trial of black colonial sailors, other individual cases followed, including that of David Samuel, another sailor from Sierra Leone.
Samuel was arrested during the police search for the person who stabbed white sailor, Michael Carlin. Samuel had no knife, but was armed with a revolver and twelve cartridges. He was brought before the divisional court on the day of the riot and was remanded on a charge of contravening the Defence of the Realm Act by having a firearm in his possession.
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Potentially the most serious case arising from the harbour rioting was that June initially appeared before the marine police court before remittance to the higher sheriff court. One of the detained men was charged with a serious assault on a white man at the Broomielaw and with 'presenting a loaded revolver' at him.
It has not been possible to discover his fate. The other 'coloured seaman', John
Robert Bell, was convicted of 'carrying a loaded revolver within the special area of the harbour without permission of the competent naval authority.' 85 He was fined £5 (or 10 days' imprisonment) for possessing a revolver and six cartridges at Glasgow harbour.
The Glasgow press recorded these isolated incidents in a small way, but devoted many pages to the outbreak of port rioting elsewhere in Britain at this time. On 18 June 1919, prompted by the wave of unrest, the 'Hal o' the Wynd'
'opinion' column in the Glasgow Evening Times made extremely racist remarks:
'In this country Sambo has been usually regarded with general tolerance. We have looked upon him as an 'amoosin' cuss', who would never create anything approaching a problem...' 86 In utilising such racist terminology the Unionist
Evening Times was in step with the dominant trend in the press reporting of the port riots around Britain. The description of black colonial Britons using racist language employed in North America no doubt owed something to the close British public awareness of American practices of discrimination and segregation.
Such 'knowledge' was based on information derived from the popular press, novels, theatre and the cinema. 87 The populist view was also shaped by attendance at 'minstrel shows' which originated in America. 88 A further example of racist reporting of the port riots appeared in the Glasgow Evening News (in an article reproduced from the Manchester Guardian). 'The quiet, apparently inoffensive, nigger becomes a demon when armed with a revolver or razor, caring for nothing except the safety of his own skin and the speediest method of overcoming his opponent.' 89 Despite the overt racism of such comments, there is no concrete evidence of press reports actively inciting violence in the ports, although this occurred in the American 'race' riots of 1919. 90 More likely, press accounts, which constantly portrayed black people in a negative light, exerted an ongoing influence over the susceptible element of their readership. The 'Hal o' the Wynd' article went on to cite the recommendation from one its readers that the only way to keep the peace between white and black was through repatriation of the latter.
One of our readers who has been ten years in West Africa directs our attention to the coloured question in Glasgow. The other day he noticed a white girl in the company of three negroes [sic] and he suggests that in the interests of law and order our city authorities should urge the Colonial Office to repatriate our embarrassing visitors immediately.
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Such biased press reporting and accompanying reader input did not go unchallenged. Evidently, the readership of the Glasgow press was not homogeneous and the editorial 'voice' of any newspaper did not speak for all of its readers. The 'Hal o' the Wynd' article in the Evening Times provoked several letters of protest. For example, a female correspondent who signed herself 'live and let live', responded that she was not the only white Glasgow female who had married a black sailor and had found the experience suited her.
I think as the white wife of a British coloured man I have a right to speak. 'Hal o' the Wynd' thinks it repulsive to see a white woman in the company of a coloured man. It is a shame to say that. They are as God made them; they cannot help the colour of their skin. We, the white wives know better than anyone what they are. We have been married for years and find the British coloured man -I don't say all, but I say most -make us very good husbands.
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Another letter from a white Glasgow woman who had been married to a black merchant sailor for twenty five years was published in the Evening Times a few weeks later. Signing herself 'justice for the coloured people' she described how her husband had brought many black friends to stay over the years. These guests she described as 'honourable and respectful' men. Black colonial sailors had made great wartime sacrifices. Her husband had been on ships that were torpedoed on four separate occasions and three black sailors who had visited the house had been drowned and two others been burned to death 'at the hands of the Germans.' 
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The fact that the Glasgow press allowed ARAG a prominent platform during the summer port riots suggests that class distinctions as well as racist attitudes were in evidence in newspaper reactions to the port riots. The association was a middle class organisation, its committee populated by professionals and skilled workers from across the British Empire and beyond, while, according to Moton, the ARAG membership (whom he encountered on his visit to Glasgow) mainly consisted of 'college students. This extended repatriation scheme was mounted across Britain's major seaports including Glasgow. By August 1921 around 2,000 black people had been repatriated from Britain.
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An internal memorandum which commented on the protests from the various black sailors' groups revealed the Colonial Office was powerless to overturn the seamen's union's 'colour' bar. It was unwilling to propose the type of legislation which would be needed to ensure that a proportion of every ship's crew consisted of 'British' subjects: '… I fear we are helpless as regards the Union attitude.'
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Protests from black British sailors about their lack of employment to the Colonial Office produced a generic letter in response. Unlike the internal civil service discussions, the official reply said nothing about the sailors' unions' intransigence; instead it blamed black unemployment on the 'unusually large numbers of seamen' then in Britain owing to demobilisation from the Navy and the return of sailors from imprisonment in Germany. 110 The weak Colonial Office response to their requests did not satisfy the Glasgow petitioners. A second letter to the Colonial Office was more strident in tone, noting that they were well aware of the over supply of sailors at that time. The letter returned to the petitioners' chief grievance, namely, that foreign sailors ('Spaniards, Swedes, Greeks and Chinese') were getting jobs while they as Britons were out of work. This second letter also mentioned the riot against black sailors at the Broomielaw as further evidence of the racism then current in Glasgow. It concluded by re-iterating the loyalty of the black population using terms which illustrate an awareness of contemporary political debates: 'we are not Bolsheviks… but we wants to enjoy the freedom which is the basis of Great Britain.' 111 The Colonial Office's reply referred the Glasgow delegates to the department's original letter citing the existing repatriation scheme and stated that they had nothing further to add.
The position of black sailors in Glasgow did not improve over the next few months. In February 1920, a letter from the Glasgow branch of the philanthropic organisation the Charity Organisation Society (COS) to the Scottish Board of Health, which dealt with Scottish welfare matters, stated that there were over 100 black workers in Glasgow who had been unemployed so long they were no longer eligible for out-of-work payments. Most of them had refused repatriation when it was offered since the £5 inducement with an additional £1 voyage allowance would not cover the reclamation of goods they had pawned over the months of their unemployment. Some had over £20 worth of goods in hock. The COS letter reported the death of one man forced to sleep rough, while others were admitted to Glasgow's Barnhill poor house suffering from exposure and hunger. 112 No voluntary or government agency seemed able to improve the lot of the unemployed black sailors in Glasgow:
The Board of Trade officials in Glasgow have done everything in their power to get them away or get employment but during the past six months not more than half a dozen coloured men got employment from Glasgow, while ships that came in with black crews left many of them behind. The result is that the numbers are gradually increasing.
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Apart from humanitarian considerations, the presence of so many discontented and semistarved men is a positive danger. 
